

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2506

INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 9690

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, UR

SUBJ: PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE GOP VIEW

SUMMARY: THE GOP REMAINS HIGHLY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT
SOVIET INTENTIONS CONCERNING PAKISTAN AND DEEPLY
SUSPICIOUS OF MOSCOW'S ACTIVITIES HERE. THE PREVAILING
MFA OPINION IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SINGLED OUT
PAKISTAN AS A KEY TARGET IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INCREASE
THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AREA AND ARE DETERMINED TO
BRING ABOUT BASIC CHANGES IN PAK POLICY FAVORABLE TO
SOVIET REGIONAL INTERESTS. THE GOP'S ADHERENCE
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TO THE ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SCHEME AND ITS

WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO ARE CONSIDERED BY THE PAKS PRIME SOVIET GOALS. THEY HOLD THAT THE HELSINKI AGREEMENT HAS FREED THE SOVS FOR A MORE ACTIVE PURSUIT OF THEIR AIMS IN SOUTH ASIA.

THE PAKS ALLEGE A SOVIET CARROT AND STICK APPROACH. THE CARROT COMPRISES EFFORTS ALLEGEDLY SPONSORED BY THE SOVS TO WIN SUPPORT AMONG INTELLECTUALS AND OTHERS FOR THE VIEW THAT ONLY MOSCOW IS IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH RELIABLE SECURITY GUARANTEES. THE "STICK" ASPECT OF THE APPROACH CONSISTS OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT PAKISTAN'S WELL KNOWN SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE COUNTRY WITH WHICH THESE ARE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED.

GOP EXPRESSION OF ITS CONCERNS REGARDING THE SOVIETS MAY AT TIMES BE OVERSTATED FOR OUR BENEFIT, BUT WE BELIEVE THEY ARE SINCERELY FELT. IN THE EMBASSY'S VIEW, PAK CHARGES THAT THE SOVS ARE ENGAGED IN HIGH-POWERED EFFORTS TO WIN OVER KEY OPINION MAKERS TO THE VIEWS SEEM SOMEWHAT OVERBLOWN. THE SOV AMBASSADOR IS ACTIVE AND AGGRESSIVE, AND THE SOVS MAKE CONSIDERABLE USE OF THE MEDIA. THE SOVS CERTAINLY APPEAR TO BE TOUGH AND OUTSPOKEN IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC DEALINGS. THEY FACE CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLES IN MOVING FORWARD, HOWEVER, AND TO DATE THEIR PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN IMPRESSIVE. WE EXPECT THAT THEY WILL PERSIST IN THEIR EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.

1. THE GOP REMAINS HIGHLY APPREHENSIVE ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS CONCERNING PAKISTAN AND DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF MOSCOW'S ACTIVITIES HERE. ALTHOUGH OPINIONS AT MFA ABOUT THE ULTIMATE AIM OF SOVIET POLICY DIFFERS, WITH SOME SENIOR OFFICIALS HOLDING TO THE XTREME VIEW THAT MOSCOW WOULD WELCOME THE EVENTUAL FURTHER DISMEMBERMENT OF THE COUNTRY, THE PREVAILING OPINION AS FREQUENTLY ASSERTED TO US AND OTHER WESTERN DIPLOMATS HERE IS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SINGLED OUT PAKISTAN AS A KEY TARGET IN THEIR EFFORTS TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE AREA AND ARE DETERMINED TO BRING ABOUT BASIC CHANGES IN PAK POLICY FAVORABLE TO SOVIET REGIONAL INTERESTS THROUGH THE CONSTANT APPLICATIONS OF VARIOUS FORMS OF

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PRESSURES AND INDUCEMENTS.

2. THE PAKS HOLD THAT THE HELSINKI DECLARATION HAS FREED THE SOVIETS TO PLAY A MORE AGGRESSIVE GAME IN SOUTH ASIA AND TO MOVE MORE ACTIVELY TO UNDERMINE BOTH CHINESE AND AMERICAN INFLUENCE HERE. THEY EXPRESS PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT FURTHER SOVIET PRESSURES ON THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY

SCHEME. IN A RECENT FORMULATION TO A VISITING DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, FOREIGN SECRETARY AGHA SHAHI SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS THE KEY COUNTRY IN THE SOVIET EFFORT TO STAGE A BREAKTHROUGH IN THEIR LONG-TERM CAMPAIGN FOR ADOPTION OF THE SCHEME. IF PAKISTAN COULD BE CRADXFOYST OTHERS WOULD FOLLOW SUIT, HE ARGUED. GOP WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTO IS ANOTHER GOAL THE PAKS SAY THE SOVS PRESS ON THEM THROUGH A VARIETY OF SUBTLE AND NOT SO SUBTLE METHODS. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF SOVIET POLICY, IN THE MFA VIEW, APPEARS TO BE A PAKISTAN WHICH (A) DOES NOT CHALLENGE BASIC SOVIET INTERESTS IN THE AREA AND IS WILLING TO ACCOMMODATE UWHOXIIS PB) ACCEPTS THE PRIMARY REGIONAL ROLE OF MOSCOW'S ALLY INDIA; AND (C) IN TURN, IS ASSURED A CONTINUED EXISTENCE THROUGH A SOV-SPONSORED COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM, AN ARRANGEMENT WHICH THE SOVIETS REPORTEDLY ASSURE THE GOP IS A MUCH MORE RELIABLE BASIS FOR GUARANTEEING PAK SECURITY THAN THE FRIENDSHIP WITH CHINA AND THE US "WHICH FAILED PAKISTAN IN 1971." THE PAKS ALLEGE THAT UNTIL THEY ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES THE SOVS ARE PREPARED TO CONDONE AND SUPPORT, IF NOT ACTIVELY TO ENCOURAGE, INDIAN AND AFGHAN MOVES AGAINST THE GOP.

3. THE PAKS SPEAK OF A CARROT AND STICK APPROACH BY THE SOVS TO ACHIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES. THE CARROT COMPRISES EFFORTS ALLEGEDLY SPONSORED BY THE SOVS TO WIN SUPPORT AMONG INTELLECTUALS AND OTHERS FOR THE VIEW THAT ONLY MOSCOW IS IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE PAKISTAN WITH RELIABLE SECURITY GUARANTEES. THE PAKS MAINTAIN THAT IN THIS APPROACH, THE SOVIETS MAKE MUCH USE OF EXCHANGE PROGRAMS, FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES, AND MEDIA PLANTS TO WIN OVER KEY OPINION MAKERS TO THIS POINT OF VIEW. MFA OFFICIALS CITE TESTIMONY BY INTELLECTUALS, CONFIDENTIAL

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NOTABLY THE EDITORS OF LEADING NEWSPAPERS WITH WHOM THEY OFTEN CONFER, TO SUPPORT THIS CONTENTIONS.

4. ALTHOUGH THE GOP DOES NOT PUT IT THIS WAY, THE

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INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-07 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

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XMB-02 OPIC-03 CIEP-01 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01 /105 W

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R 200800Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2507

INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USLO PEKING

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 9690

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

"STICK" SIDE OF THE APPORACH CONSSISTS OF SOVIET EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT PAKISTAN'S WELL KNOWN SECURITY CONCERNS AND THE REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE COUNTRY WITH WHICH THESE ARE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED. THE SOVS, THE PAKS ALLEGE, SEEK TO KEEP THEM CONCERNED ABOUT MOSCOW'S VIEW OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS AND ABOUT ATTITUDES TOWARD THE POLITICAL EFFORTS OF REGIONAL FORCES IN PAKISTAN. THEIR DIPLOMATIC METHODS IN CARRYING OUT THESE TACTICS ARE CRUDE AND BLUSTERING, THE PAKS SAY, AND THEY COMPLAIN THAT THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IS PARTICULARLY HEAVY-HANDED IN HIS APPROACH WHEN DEALING WITH THE WORKING LEVEL OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE. THEY
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ALSO NOTE THAT THE SOVS AT TIMES SEEM TO MAKE USE OF OTHER BLOC DIPLOMATS TO GET THEIR MESSAGE ACROSS; THE EAST GERMANS AND THE BULGARIANS THEY SAY ARE OFTEN PLACED OUT IN FRONT IN THIS DESIGN.

5. THE PAKS COMPLAIN THAT WE DO NOT TAKE THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT THE SOVIETS AS SERIOUSLY AS WE SHOULD AND FIND FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THEIR AND OUR APPRAISALS OF MOSCOW'S INTENTIONS. (THEIR APPREHENSIONS ARE IN PART PROMPTED BY A FEAR THAT WE ARE WITHDRAWING FROM SOUTH ASIA AND THUS OFFERING THE SOVS INCREASING OPPORTUNITIES HERE.) WHILE WE SUSPECT THAT THE EXPRESSION OF THESE CONCERNS MAY AT TIMES BE OVERSTATED FOR OUR BENEFIT, WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT THEY ARE BASICALLY SINCERELY FELT. WHILE THE DEPARTMENT AND EMBASSY MOSCOW ARE OBVIOUSLY IN A BETTER POSITION THAN WE TO ASSESS THE VALIDITY OF THESE PAK APPREHENSIONS, WE DO HAVE SOME COMMENTS ON SOVIET METHODS AS SEEN FROM AND IN ISLAMABAD.

6. PAK CHARGES THAT THE SOVS ARE ENGAGED IN HIGH-POWERED EFFORTS TO WIN OVER KEY OPINION MAKERS TO THEIR VIEWS ON THE PREFERRED PATTERN OF PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS SEEM SOMEWHAT OVERBLOWN. THE NUMBER OF PAK-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES HAS INCREASED IN RECENT YEARS BUT TOTAL MEMBERSHIP REMAINS INSIGNIFICANT, PROBABLY LESS THAN 1,000. THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO USE THEIR SOV FRIENDSHIP HOUSE IN KARACHE EFFECTIVELY, HAVE RECENTLY OPENED ONE IN LAHORE, AND ARE SEEKING TO START ONE IN ISLAMABAD/PINDI. THE FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES GOT A BOOST FROM THE REVIVAL, IN THE PAST FEW YEARS, OF THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL AND THE AFRO-ASIAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY. NONE OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS IS PARTICULARLY INFLUENTIAL, AND THE EMBERS ARE THE SAME TIRED FELLOW TRAVELERS AND COMMUNISTS SUCH AS FAIZ AHMED FAIZ, LENIN PRIZE-WINNING POET. THEY HAVE NO BROAD APPEAL, ALTHOUGH THEY DO SELECT AND SPONSOR PAK STUDENTS TO STUDY AT LUMUMBA FRIENDSHIP UNIVERSITY IN MOSCOW. THEY ALSO HOLD CULTURAL PRESENTATIONS AND THE LIKE, BUT THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO WISH TO DOWNPLAY ANY OFFICIAL CONNECTION, EXCEPT WHEN THE AMBASSADOR MAKES SOME OFFICIAL

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PRESENTATION OR SPEECH.

7. AMBASSADOR AZIMOV IS VERY AGGRESSIVE IN PUSHING THE SOVIET LINE AT MFA AND BEHIND-THE-SCENES HE PLAYS A VERY ACTIVE ROLE. HE IS KNOWN TO BELIEVE THAT WHILE SOVIET ACTIVITIES ARE GOING WELL IN SIND AND SOTHERN PUNJAB, THEY ARE SUFFERING IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY. HE HAS WANTED TO BEEF UP THE CULTURAL STAFF IN ISLAMABAD, BUT APPARENTLY MOSCOW HAS REJECTED HIS SUGGESTION TO MOVE THE MAIN PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT (APN, WHICH HAS OFFICES IN BOTH KARACHI AND ISLAMABAD) TO ISLAMABAD, MAKING KARACHI A BRANCH OFFICE.

8. THE SOVIETS MAKE CONSIDERABLE USE OF THE MEDIA, MOST OF IT IN THE VERNACULAR PRESS. WE HAVE NO FIGURES ON THIS. THEY GET MUCH MATERIAL INTO THE URDU PRESS SIMPLY BY HAVING APN MATERIAL TRANSLATED INTO URDU AND DISTRIBUTING IT. SOMETIMES THEY WILL PAY TO HAVE THINGS PUBLISHED, BUT THIS IS OFTEN UNNECESSARY AS THE SMALL PAPERS ARE WILLING TO PRINT JUST ABOUT ANYTHING. THE SOVS ARE ALSO SOMETIMES SUCCESSFUL IN GETTING APN MATERIAL INTO THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE PRESS. THE GOP IS AWARE OF AND IS SEEKING TO RESTRICT THE HEAVY SOVIET USE OF THE MEDIA: AN EXAMPLE WAS THE INABILITY OF THE SOVS TO GET MUCH OF THEIR MATERIAL HAILING THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II INTO THE BIG PAPERS

9. TARGET GROUPS ARE THE USUAL ONES, WITH EMPHASIS ON LABOR. WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ON THIS, BUT IT APPEARS TO BE THEIR TRADITIONAL APPROACH. THEY ARE PROBABLY SEEKING TO WIN CONTROL OF LABOR UNIONS. THEY ARE ALSO AFTER THE INTELLECTUALS, AS THE PAKS ALLEGE. THEIR APPROACH, HOWEVER, IS BASICALLY A MASS ONE; IT IS LIKELY TO HAVE SOME EFFECT OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, IF ONLY BECAUSE SO MUCH PRINTED MATERIAL PROVIDED BY THEM IS AVAILABLE SO CHEAPLY.

10. SOME PAK OFFICIALS COMPLAIN THAT THE SOVS ARE SEEKING TO USE ECONOMIC PROJECTS FOR INFILTRATION AND SUBVERSION (THOUGH THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO INHIBIT

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GOP INTEREST IN SUCH ASSISTANCE). WE DOUBT THAT THIS FEAR HAS ANY SERIOUS BASIS. THE SOVS ARE INVOLVED IN THE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE HERE AS A WAY OF DEMONSTRATING THEIR INTEREST IN PAKISTAN DEVELOPMENT, AND THUS EXPANDING THEIR INFLUENCE. WHILE THE SOVIETS PROBABLY HOPE TO MAKE USE OF THEIR TECHNICIANS' PRESENCE AS A MEANS FOR IMPROVING THEIR IMAGE AND MAKING A POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT ON THE PAKISTANIS, PAK APPREHENSIONS THAT THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET-AIDED KARACHI STEEL MILL, THE USSR'S FOCAL ECONOMIC PROJECT HERE, WILL INVOLVE THE INTRODUCTION OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET SPIES AND SUBVERSIVES STRIKES US AS LACKING VALIDITY.

11. THE SOVS CERTAINLY APPEAR TO BE TOUGH AND OUT-SPOKEN IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC DEALINGS HERE, AND WE CAN UNDERSTAND WHY OFFICIALS AT MFA FIND IT UNPLEASANT TO DO BUSINESS WITH THEM. THEY SEEM EVIDENTLY TO BELIEVE THAT THE BLUSTERING APPROACH IS EFFECTIVE THERE AND THAT THIS ASPECT OF THEIR STRATEGY WILL EVENTUALLY HELP THEM

ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS.

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2508

INFO AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 ISLAMABAD 9690

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

12. THE SOVS FACE CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLES IN MOVING FORWARD, THE MISTRUST OF THE GOP AND LARGE SEGMENTS OF THE PAK PUBLIC FOREMOST AMONG THEM. THE ANTI-INDIAN BIAS OF THE COUNTRY AND ITS LEADERS, THEIR AWARENESS OF THE USSR'S HISTORICAL SUPPORT FOR INDIA, AND THEIR RECOGNITION THAT IN ANY SOVIET-ORDERED SECURITY ARRANGEMENT IN SOUTH ASIA PAKISTAN WOULD PLAY A ROLE DISTINCTLY SECONDARY TO INDIA'S IS A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR THE SOVIETS HERE. TO DATE, THE SOVIETS' PROGRESS HAS NOT BEEN IMPRESSIVE. WE EXPECT THAT THEY WILL PERSIST IN THEIR EFFORTS. BYROADE

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